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Abstract: Mobile Ad hoc NETworks (MANETs) are leaving the confines
of research laboratories, to find place in real-world deployments. Outside spe-
cialized domains (military, vehicular, etc.), city-wide community-networks are
emerging, connecting regular Internet users with each other, and with the In-
ternet, via MANETs. Growing to encompass more than a handful of “trusted
participants”, the question of preserving the MANET network connectivity,
even when faced with careless or malicious participants, arises, and must be
addressed.
A first step towards protecting a MANET is to analyze the vulnerabilities
of the routing protocol, managing the connectivity. By understanding how the
algorithms of the routing protocol operate, and how these can be exploited by
those with ill intent, countermeasures can be developed, readying MANETs for
wider deployment and use.
This memorandumtakes an abstract look at the algorithms that constitute
the Optimized Link State Routing Protocol version 2 (OLSRv2), and identifies
for each protocol element the possible vulnerabilities and attacks – in a certain
way, provides a “cookbook” for how to best attack an operational OLSRv2 net-
work, or for how to proceed with developing protective countermeasures against
these attacks.
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Security Issues in the Optimized Link State
Routing Protocol version 2 (OLSRv2)
Re´sume´ : Les re´seaux mobiles MANETs (Mobile Ad hoc NETworks) sor-
tent des laboratoires de recherche pour eˆtre de´ploye´s dans le monde re´el. Outre
les applications spe´cilise´es (militaires, ve´hiculaires etc.), des re´seaux commu-
nautaires urbains e´mergent pour connecter des simples utilisateurs d’Internet
a` d’autres utilisateurs et a` Internet via MANETs. Pour supporter un nombre
croissant d’utilisateurs au-dela` d’une poigne´e de participants de confiance, la
question de pre´server la connectivite´ des re´seaux MANET face a` des utilisa-
teurs imprudents ou malicieux se pose.
Un premier pas vers la protection de MANET est d’analyser les vulne´rabilite´s
du protocole de routage qui ge`re la connectivite´. En comprenant en profondeur
comment les algorithmes du protocole de routage ope`rent et comment ils peuvent
eˆtre exploite´s par des utilisateurs inde´licats, des contre-mesures peuvent eˆtre
de´veloppe´es afin de rendre MANET preˆt a` eˆtre de´ploye´ a` plus grande e´chelle.
Ce rapport examine de manie`re conceptuelle les algorithmes qui constituent
le protocole OLSRv2 (Optimized Link State Routing Protocol version 2) et pour
chaque e´le´ment du protocole identifie les e´ventuelles vulne´rabilite´s et attaques
possibles. En quelque sorte, le rapport procure un manuel sur la meilleure fac¸on
d’attaquer un re´seau OLSRv2 ope´rationnel, mais aussi sur les me´thodes pour
de´velopper les contre-mesures pour se prote´ger de ces attaques.
Mots-cle´s : Security, OLSR, OLSRv2, MANET, Vulnerability Analysis
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1 Introduction
OLSRv2 (the Optimized Link State Routing Protocol version 2) [1], [2], [3], [4],
[5] is a successor to the widely deployed OLSR [6] routing protocol for MANETs
(Mobile Ad hoc NETworks). OLSRv2 retains the same basic algorithms as its
predecessor, however offers various improvements, e.g. a modular and flexible
architecture allowing extensions, such as for security, to be developed as add-ons
to the basic protocol.
The developments reflected in OLSRv2 have been motivated by increased
real-world deployment experiences, e.g. from networks such as FunkFeuer [7],
and the requirements presented for continued successful operation of these net-
works. With participation in such networks increasing (the FunkFeuer commu-
nity network has, e.g., roughly 400 individual participants), operating with the
assumption, that participants can be “trusted” to behave in a non-destructive
way, is utopia. Taking the Internet as an example, as participation in the net-
work increases and becomes more diverse, more efforts are required to preserve
the integrity and operation of the network. Most SMTP-servers were, e.g., ini-
tially available for use by all and sundry on the Internet – with an increased
populace on the Internet, attacks and abuses caused the recommended prac-
tice is today to require authentication and accounting for users of such SMTP
servers [8].
A first step towards hardening against attacks disrupting the connectivity
of a network, is to understand the vulnerabilities of routing protocol, managing
the connectivity. This memorandum therefore analyzes OLSRv2, to understand
its inherent vulnerabilities and resiliences. The authors do not claim complete-
ness of the analysis, but hope that the identified attacks, as presented, form a
meaningful starting-point for developing secured OLSRv2 networks.
1.1 OLSRv2 Overview
OLSRv2 contains three basic processes: Neighborhood Discovery, MPR Flood-
ing and Link State Advertisements, described in the below with sufficient details
for elaborating the analysis in latter sections of this memorandum.
1.1.1 Neighborhood Discovery
Neighborhood Discovery is the process, whereby each router discovers the routers
which are in direct communication range of itself (1-hop neighbors), and detects
with which of these it can establish bi-directional communication. Each router
sends HELLOs, listing the identifiers of all the routers from which it has re-
cently received a HELLO, as well as the “status” of the link (heard, verified
bi-directional). A router a receiving a HELLO from a neighbor b, in which
b indicates to have recently received a HELLO from a, considers the link a-b
to be bi-directional. As b lists identifiers of all its neighbors in its HELLO, a
learns the “neighbors of its neighbors” (2-hop neighbors) through this process.
HELLOs are sent periodically, however certain events may trigger non-periodic
HELLOs.
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1.1.2 MPR Flooding
MPR Flooding is the process whereby each router is able to, efficiently, conduct
network-wide broadcasts. Each router designates, from among its bi-directional
neighbors, a subset (MPR set) such that a message transmitted by the router
and relayed by the MPR set is received by all its 2-hop neighbors. MPR selection
is encoded in outgoing HELLOs.
Routers may express, in their HELO messages, their “willingness” (integer
between 1 “will never” and 7 “will always”) to be selected as MPR, which
is taken into consideration for the MPR calculation, and which is useful for
example when an OLSRv2 network is “planned”. The set of routers having
selected a given router as MPR is the MPR-selector-set of that router. A study
of the MPR flooding algorithm can be found in [9].
1.1.3 Link State Advertisement
Link State Advertisement is the process whereby routers are determining which
link state information to advertise through the network. Each router must ad-
vertise, at least, all links between itself and its MPR-selector-set, in order to
allow all routers to calculate shortest paths. Such link state advertisements are
carried in TCs, broadcast through the network using the MPR flooding pro-
cess described above. As a router selects MPRs only from among bi-directional
neighbors, links advertised in TC are also bi-directional and routing paths cal-
culated by OLSRv2 contain only bi-directional links. TCs are sent periodically,
however certain events may trigger non-periodic TCs.
1.2 Link State Vulnerability Taxonomy
Proper functioning of OLSRv2 assumes that (i) each router can acquire and
maintain a topology map, accurately reflecting the effective network topology;
and (ii) that the network converges, i.e. that all routers in the network will have
sufficiently identical topology maps. An OLSRv2 network can be disrupted by
breaking either of these assumptions, specifically (a) routers may be prevented
from acquiring a topology map of the network; (b) routers may acquire a topol-
ogy map, which does not reflect the effective network topology; and (c) two or
more routers may acquire inconsistent topology maps.
1.3 OLSRv2 Attack Vectors
Besides “radio jamming”, attacks on OLSRv2 consist of a malicious router in-
jecting “correctly looking, but invalid, control traffic” (TCs, HELLOs) into the
network. A malicious router can either (a) lie about itself (its ID, its willingness
to serve as MPR), henceforth Identity Spoofing or (b) lie about its relationship
to other routers (pretend existence of links to other routers), henceforth Link
Spoofing. Such attacks will in-fine cause disruption in the Link State Advertise-
ment process, through targeting the MPR Flooding mechanism, or by causing
incorrect link state information to be included in TCs, causing routers to have
incomplete, inaccurate or inconsistent topology maps. In a different class of
attacks, a malicious router injects control traffic, tuned to cause an in-router
resource exhaustion, e.g. by causing the algorithms calculating routing tables
INRIA
Security Issues in OLSRv2 5
or MPR sets to be invoked continuously, preventing the internal state of the
router from converging.
1.4 Memorandum Outline
The remainder of this memorandum is organized as follows: section 2, 3, 4
and 5 each represents a class of disruptive attacks against OLSRv2, detailing
a number of attacks in each class. Section 6 summarizes inherent resilience, as
observed in OLSRv2, and the memorandum is concluded in section 7.
2 Topology Map Acquisition
Topology Map Acquisition relates to the ability for any given router in the
network to acquire a representation of the network connectivity. A router,
unable to acquire a topology map, is incapable of calculating routing paths and
participating in forwarding data. Topology map acquisition can be hindered by
(a) TCs to not being delivered to (all) routers in the network, such as what
happens in case of Flooding Disruption, or (b) in case of “jamming” of the
communication channel.
2.1 Flooding Disruption
MPR selection (section 1.1.2) uses information about a router’s 1-hop and 2-
hop neighborhood, assuming that (i) this information is accurate, and (ii) all
1-hop neighbors are equally apt as MPR. Thus, a malicious router seeking to
attack the MPR Flooding process will seek to manipulate the 1-hop and 2-hop
neighborhood information in a router such as to cause the MPR selection to
fail.
2.1.1 Flooding Disruption due to Identity Spoofing
Figure 1(a) illustrates a network in which the malicious router (gray circle)
spoofs the identity of b, i.e.a receives HELLOs from two routers, both pretend-
ing to be b. As HELLOs are additive, and with the malicious router X not
advertising any neighbors, the topological view of the 1-hop and 2-hop neigh-
borhood of a is unaffected by the presence of X: a’s MPR selection will function
correctly by selecting (if using a greedy algorithm) d.
e
b
c
d
Xa
spoofs b
(a) The gray malicious
router spoofs address of b
e
b
cd
Xa
spoofs b
(b) The malicious router spoofs ad-
dress of b and advertises a link to
c
Figure 1: Identity Spoofing: flooding attack: 1-hop address duplication.
Figure 1(b) illustrates a network in which the malicious router X (gray circle)
spoofs the identity of b. In this example, a link (the dotted line) between X
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and c is correctly detected and advertised by X. Router a will receive HELLOs
indicating that links exist from b to both e and c, thereby rendering b a candidate
MPR on par with d.
If X does not forward flooded traffic (i.e.does not accept MPR selection), its
presence entails a flooding disruption: selecting b over d renders c unreachable
by flooded traffic. In order to increase the likelihood that the malicious X is
selected, it may set its willingess to 7 (max), ensuring that it is always selected
and the routers so covered are not further considered in the MPR selection
algorithm.
cb
d
xX a
spoofs x
Figure 2: Identity Spoofing: flooding attack: 2-hop address duplication.
Figure 2 illustrates a network in which the malicious router X (gray circle)
spoofs the identity of x, i.e.a and c both receive HELLOs from a router pre-
tending to be x. From the point of view of b, it appears as if a and c hve the
same neighbor set, hence either is a suitable choice as MPR. Assuming that b
selects a as MPR, c will not relay flooded traffic and thus the legitimate (white)
x (and routers to the “right” of x) will not receive flooded traffic.
In order to maximize the impact of the disruption, the malicious router may
simultaneously “spoof” multiple identities: by overhearing control traffic for a
while, the malicious router may attempt to learn the identities of neighbors of
c and spoof these – and, in addition, assume one additional identity (possibly
not otherwise present in the network). A way of achieving this is to simply
have X overhear all TCs, and spoof all identities of all routers in the network
(possibly excluding a). Router b will learn through the HELLOs of a that all
these identities are 2-hop neighbors of a. As the set of identities spoofed by the
malicious X is a superset of the neighbors of c, this will cause selection of a as
MPR, and consequently that c is not selected.
bx Xa
c
spoofs x
Figure 3: Identity Spoofing: flooding attack: 1 and 2-hop address duplication.
Figure 3 illustrates a network in which the malicious router X (gray circle)
spoofs the identity of x, i.e.a and b both receive HELLOs from a router pre-
tending to be x. Router b will therefore not select a as MPR as all the 2-hop
neighbors reachable via a are already reachable directly in one hop. As a conse-
quence, the white x, and any routers “to the left” of it, will not receive flooded
control traffic from b or transited via b from e.g.c.
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2.1.2 Flooding Disruption due to Link Spoofing
Figure 4(a) illustrates a network, in which the malicious router X spoofs links to
the non-existing c, i.e.a receives HELLOs from X, pretending the existence of a
link between X and c. This forces a to select X as MPR – whereas it otherwise
would not need to select any MPRs. In this simple example, this does no harm
as such.
Xa c
(a) Basic Link Spoofing
effect on MPR Selection
b Xa
c
w
cd
s
(b) Flooding disruption due to Link Spoof-
ing
Figure 4: Link Spoofing: Flooding Disruption
Figure 4(b) illustrates a network, in which the malicious X spoofs links to
the existing c, as well as to a non-existing w. Router a receives HELLO from X
reporting links to c and w, and from b reporting a link to c only. Unless if b has
a advertised a willingness of 7, this will cause a to select X as its only MPR, as
X presumably covers all 2-hop neighbors of a (i.e.the real neighbors of a as well
as the imaginary w).
The consequence is that as a will not select b as MPR, b will not relay flooded
messages received from a. Thus, the network to the left of b (starting with c)
will not receive any flooded messages from or transiting a, such as a message
originating from s and transiting through a.
2.2 Radio Jamming
Radio jamming is an attack in which legitimate access to the communications
channel between routers is forcefully hindered by a malicious device. The classic
example hereof is where a powerful transmitter is generating “white noise” over
the communications channel where the network interfaces of the routers would
otherwise operate, effectively preventing these router interfaces from successfully
receiving transmissions from each other. While this can happen on all network
interface and channel types, wireless networks are especially vulnerable to such;
commercial WiFi “jammers” are, for example, readily available [10].
The consequence of such jamming is that the router interfaces, which are
so “jammed”, are unable to receive routing protocol control traffic, and so are
unable to participate in the network. A router where all its network interfaces
are victim to “jamming” is, effectively, unable to acquire a topology map of the
network and, so, is disconnected from the network.
It can be observed that a router with multiple network interfaces accessing
different communications channels, and where not all communications channels
are jammed, may still be able to participate in a network via links over these
non-jammed interfaces.
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b Xa
Figure 5: Radio Jamming: X is jamming reception within the grayed-out area,
thus b is unable to correctly receive transmission.
It can also be observed that while direct jamming affects reception, it may
(depending on which lower layers L1/L2 are employed) not affect transmission.
Thus, and as illustrated in figure 5, a, may receive transmissions from b, the
latter of which is otherwise “jammed” by X, which prevents receptions in the
grayed area.
The Neighborhood Discovery mechanism of OLSRv2 identifies uni- and bidi-
rectionality of links, and only bi-directional links are advertised and used for
routing path calculations. OLSRv2 has, thus, by virtue of this detection and
use of only bi-directional links, some resilience to jamming: while the jammed
routers are unable to acquire and maintain a topology map of the network,
the jammed routers appear as simply “disconnected” to the un-jammed part of
the network – which is able to both maintain accurate and consistent topology
maps.
2.3 Attack on Jittering
OLSRv2 incorporates a jittering: a random, but bounded, delay on outgoing
control traffic. This may be necessary when link layers (such as 802.11 [11]) are
used, which do not guarantee collision-free delivery of frames, and where jitter
can reduce the probability of collisions of frames on lower layers is [1].
In OLSRv2, TC forwarding is jittered by a value between 0 and MAX_JITTER.
In figure 6, a router receives three packets, each containing one TC to be for-
warded. For each of these, the scheduled retransmission time is calculated as
“now plus jitter”, illustrated by the horizontal arrows.
In order to reduce the number of transmissions, when a control message
is due for transmission, OLSRv2 piggybags all queued messages into a single
transmission. Thus, if a malicious router sends many TCs within a very short
time interval, the jitter time of the attacked router tends to 0. This renders
jittering ineffective and can lead to collisions on L2.
2.4 Hop-count and Hop-limit Attacks
The hop-count and hop-limit fields are the only parts of a TC that are modified
when forwarding. A malicious router can modify either of these when, when
forwarding TCs.
2.4.1 Modifying the Hop Limit
A malicious router can decrease the hop limit when forwarding a TC. This will
reduce the scope of forwarding the message, and may lead to some routers in
INRIA
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time
incoming
scheduled tx time
effective tx time of all messages
packet 1 2 3
Figure 6: Jittering: If several messages are scheduled to be transmitted, all the
messages are sent at the minimum of the scheduled transmission times.
the network not receiving that TC. Note that this is not necessarily the same
as not relaying the message (i.e. setting the hop limit to 0), as illustrated in
figure 7.
c X
b
T
C
a
TC
Figure 7: Hop limit attack
A TC arrives at and is forwarded by a, such that it is received by both b and
the malicious X. X can forward the TC without any delay (including without
jitter) such that its transmissions arrives before that of b at c. Before forwarding,
it significantly reduces the hop limit of the message. Router c receives the TC,
processes (and forwards) it, and marks it as already received - causing it to
discard further copies received from b. Thus, if the TC is forwarded by c, it has
a very low hop limit and will not reach the whole network.
2.4.2 Modifying the Hop Count
A malicious router can modify the hop count when forwarding a TC. This may
have two consequences: (i) if the hop count is set to the maximum value, then
the TC will be forwarded no further by, or (ii) artificially manipulating the
hop count may affect the validity time as calculated by recipients, when using
distance-dependent validity times as defined in [3] (e.g.as part of a fish-eye
extension to OLSR2 [12]).
c b a
TC
d
v_time(1 hop):
2s
v_time(2hops):
4s
v_time(3hops):
6s
Figure 8: Different validity times based on the distance in hops
In figure 8, a sends a TC with a validity time of two seconds for neighbors
that are one hop away, four seconds for routers in a two-hop distance and six
seconds in a three-hop distance. If c is a malicious router and modifies the
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hop count (say, by decreasing it to 0), then d will calculate the validity time of
received information to two seconds – after which it expires unless refreshed. If
TCs from a are sent less frequently than that up to 3 hops, this causes links
advertised in such TCs to be only intermittently available to d.
3 Effective Topology
Link-state protocols assume that each router can acquire an accurate topology
map, reflecting the effective network topology. This implies that the routing
protocol, through its message exchange, identifies a path from a source to a
destination, and this path is valid for forwarding data traffic. If an attacker
disturbs the correct protocol behavior, the perceived topology map of a router
can permanently differ from the effective topology.
Considering the example in figure 9(a), which illustrates the topology map
as acquired by s. This topology map indicates that the routing protocol has
identified that for s, a path exists to d via b, which it therefore assumes can be
used for transmitting data. If, effectively, b does not forward data traffic from
s, then the topology map in s does not accurately reflect the effective network
topology. Rather, the effective network topology from the point of view of s
would be as indicated in figure 9(b): d is not part of the network reachable from
router s.
s b d
(a) Perceived topology by s
s b
(b) Effective topology
Figure 9: Incorrect Data Traffic Forwarding
3.1 Incorrect Forwarding
OLSRv2 routers exchange information using link-local transmissions (link-local
multicast or limited broadcast) for their control messages, with the routing
process in each router retransmitting received messages destined for network-
wide diffusion. Thus, if the operating system in a router is not configured to
enable forwarding, this will not affect the operating of the routing protocol, or
the topology map acquired by the routing protocol. It will, however, cause a
discrepancy between the effective topology and the topology map, as indicated
in figure 9(a) and figure 9(b).
This situation is not hypothetical. A common error seen when deploying
OLSRv2 based networks using Linux-based computers as router is to neglect
enabling IP forwarding.
3.2 Wormholes
A wormhole, depicted in the example in figure 10, may be established between
two collaborating devices, connected by an out-of-band channel; these devices
send traffic through the “tunnel” to their alter-ego, which “replays” the traffic.
Thus, d and s appear as-if direct neighbors and reachable from each other in
INRIA
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1 hop through the tunnel, with the path through the MANET being 100 hops
long.
s d
100 hop long path
1 hop long path via "wormhole"
Figure 10: Wormholing between two collaborating devices not participating in
the routing protocol.
The consequences of such a wormhole in the network depends on the detailed
behavior of the wormhole. If the wormhole relays only control traffic, but not
data traffic, the same considerations as in section 3.1 applies. If, however, the
wormhole relays all traffic, control and data alike, it is connectivity-wise identical
to a usable link – and the routing protocol will correctly generate a topology
map reflecting the effective network topology. The efficiency of the topology
so obtained depends on (i) the wormhole characteristics, (ii) how the wormhole
presents itself and (iii) how paths are calculated.
Assuming that paths are calculated with unit-cost for all links, including the
“link” presented by the wormhole: if the real characteristics of the wormhole
are as-if it was a path of more than 100 hops (e.g. with respect to delay,
bandwidth, ....), then the presence of the wormhole results in a degradation
in performance as compared to using the non-wormhole path. Conversely, if
the “link” presented by the wormhole has better characteristics, the wormhole
results in improved performance.
If paths are calculated using non-unit-costs for all links, and if the cost of
the “link” presented by the wormhole correctly represents the actual cost (e.g.
if the cost is established through measurements across the wormhole), then the
wormhole may in the worst case cause no degradation in performance, in the
best case improve performance by offering a better path. If the cost of the “link”
presented by the wormhole is misrepresented, then the same considerations as
for unit-cost links apply.
An additional consideration with regards to wormholes is, that such may
present topologically attractive paths for the network – however it may be un-
desirable to have data traffic transit such a path: an attacker could, by virtue
of introducing a wormhole, acquire the ability to record and inspect transiting
data traffic.
3.3 Sequence Number Attacks
OLSRv2 uses two different sequence numbers in TCs, to (i) avoid processing and
forwarding the same message more than once (Message Sequence Number), and
(ii) to ensure that old information, arriving late due to e.g. long paths or other
delays, is not allowed to overwrite fresher information (Advertised Neighbor
Sequence Number – ANSN).
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3.3.1 Message Sequence Number
An attack may consist of a malicious router spoofing the identity of another
router in the network, and transmitting a large number of TCs, each with
different Message Sequence Numbers. Subsequent TCs with the same sequence
numbers, originating from the router whose identity was spoofed, would thence
be ignored, until eventually information concerning these “spoofed” TCs expires.
3.3.2 Advertised Neighbor Sequence Number (ANSN)
An attack may consist of a malicious router spoofing the identity of another
router in the network, and transmitting a single TC, with an ANSN significantly
larger than that which was last used by the legitimate router. Routers will retain
this larger ANSN as “the most fresh information” and discard subsequent TCs
with lower sequence numbers as being “old”.
3.4 Message Timing Attacks
In OLSRv2, each control message may contain explicit “validity time” and “in-
terval time”, identifying the duration for which information in that control
message should be considered valid until discarded, and the time until the next
control message of the same type should be expected [3].
3.4.1 Interval Time Attack
A use of the expected interval between two successive HELLOs is for determining
the link quality in Neighbor Discovery process, as described in [6]: if messages
are not received with the expected intervals (e.g. a certain fraction of messages
are missing), then this may be used to exclude a link from being considered
as useful, even if (some) bi-directional communication has been verified. If a
malicious X spoofs the identity of an existing a, and sends HELLOs indicating a
very low interval time, b receiving this HELLO will expect the following HELLO
to arrive within the interval time indicated – or otherwise, decrease the link
quality for the link a-b. Thus, X may cause b’s estimate of the link quality for
the link a-b to fall below the limit, where it is no longer considered as useful
and, thus, not used.
3.4.2 Validity Time Attack
A similar attack – with respect to the interval time attack – uses the validity
time included in HELLO and TCs. The validity time defines how long the
information contained in the message should be considered as valid. After this
time, the receiving router must consider the message content to no longer be
valid (unless repeated in a later message) [3].
A malicious router, X, can spoof the identity of a a and send a HELLO
using a very low validity time (e.g. 1 ms). b, receiving this, will discard the
information upon expiration of that interval, i.e. a link a-b will be “torn down”
by X.
INRIA
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3.5 Indirect Jamming
Indirect Jamming is an attack in which a malicious router is, by its actions,
causing legitimate routers to generate inordinate amounts of control traffic,
thereby increasing both channel occupation and the overhead incurred in each
router for processing this control traffic. This control traffic will be originated
from legitimate routers, thus to the wider network, the malicious device may
remain undetected.
The general mechanism whereby a malicious device can cause indirect jam-
ming is for it to participate in the protocol by generating plausible control
traffic, and to tune this control traffic to in turn trigger receiving routers to
generate additional traffic. For OLSRv2, such an indirect attack can be di-
rected at, respectively, the Neighborhood Discovery mechanism and the Link
State Advertisement mechanism.
3.5.1 Indirect Jamming: Neighborhood Discovery
An indirect jamming attack on the Neighborhood Discovery process is illustrated
in figure 11.
a
X
t0
Indicate b 
as SYM
X
t1
MPRs: (X)
a a
X
t2
Indicate b
as LOST
X
t3
MPRs: ()
a
b b
Figure 11: Indirect Jamming in Neighborhood Discovery: the malicious X spoofs
a link to b, flipping between link status “SYM” and “LOST”.
A malicious router, X, advertises in a HELLO that it has as link to b, with
status SYM (t0). This will cause a, upon receiving this HELLO, to consider b
as a 2-hop neighbor, and recalculate its MPR set – selecting X as MPR. This
MPR selection is signaled by a in a subsequent HELLO (t1). Upon receipt of
this HELLO from a, X advertises in a HELLO that the link to b is LOST (t2).
This will cause a, upon receiving this HELLO, to no longer consider b as a 2-hop
neighbor, and recalculate its MPR set accordingly, i.e. to no longer contain X.
This new MPR set in a is signaled in a subsequent HELLO (t3). Upon X having
received this HELLO from a, it may repeat the cycle, alternating advertising
the link X-b as LOST and SYM.
In order to maximize the impact of the disruption caused by this attack,
X should ensure that the router, to which it alternatively advertises a link
as SYM or LOST, is not otherwise present in the 2-hop neighborhood – for
example by advertising a router not otherwise present in the network. That
way, all neighbors receiving a HELLO from X will select X as MPR. A way of
accomplishing this is to have X learn all identities in the network by overhearing
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all TCs – and selecting (spoofing) an identity not already present. X will indicate
its willingness to be non-zero (thus, accepting being selected as MPR) and
participate in the Neighborhood Discovery procedure – and may ignore all other
protocol operations, while still remaining effective as an attacker.
An easier version of this attack is to have X simply be present in the network,
and participate in the Neighborhood Discovery procedure. Without spoofing a
link to another router, X alternates its willingness as advertised in successive
HELLO transmissions between zero (will never be selected as MPR) and 7 (will
always be selected as MPR). The impact of this version of the attack is as above:
MPR set recalculation and advertisement by neighbors of the X.
The basic Neighborhood Discovery process of OLSRv2 employs periodic mes-
sage emissions, and by this attack it can be ensured that for each message ex-
change between X and a, the MPR set in a is recalculated. As calculation of an
optimal MPR set is known to be NP-hard [13], this alone may cause internal
resource exhaustion in a.
If the routers in the network have “triggered HELLOs” enabled, and that
such are triggered by MPR set updates (as suggested in section 9 in [5]) this
attack may also cause an increased HELLO frequency. A minimum message
interval (typically much smaller than the regular periodic message interval) is
imposed, to rate-limit worst-case message emissions. This attack can cause
the HELLO interval to, permanently, become equal to the minimum message
interval. [5] proposes that default that the minimum HELLO interval be 1
4
·
HELLO interval.
Indirect Jamming of the Neighborhood Discovery process by a malicious
router can thus have two effects: to cause increased frequency of HELLO gener-
ation and transmission by neighbors of the malicious router, i.e. up to two hops
away from the malicious router, and to cause additional MPR set calculation in
the routers which are neighbors of a malicious router.
3.5.2 Indirect Jamming: Link State Advertisement
The most efficient Indirect Jamming attack in OLSRv2 is to target control
traffic, destined for network-wide diffusion. This is illustrated in figure 12.
a
X
t0
Select as 
MPR
X
t1
TC: (X-a)
       ANSN
a
ANS={X}
ANSN++
a
X
t2
Indicate as
LOST
X
t3
TC: ()
       ANSN
a
ANS={}
ANSN++
Figure 12: Indirect Jamming in Link State Advertisement: the malicious X flips
between link status “MPR” and “LOST”.
The malicious X selects the a as MPR (t0) in a HELLO. This causes X to
appear as MPR selector for a and, consequently, a sets X to be advertised in its
“Neighbor Set” and increments the associated “Advertised Neighbor Sequence
Number” (ANSN). a must, then, advertise the link between itself and X in
subsequent outgoing TCs (t1), also including the ANSN in such TCs. Upon X
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having received this TC, it declares the link between itself and a as no longer
valid (t2) in a HELLO (indicating the link to a as LOST). Since only symmetric
links are advertised by OLSRv2 routers, a will upon receipt hereof remove X
from the set of advertised neighbors and increment the ANSN. a will then in
subsequent TCs advertise the remaining set of advertised neighbors (i.e. with X
removed) and the corresponding ANSN (t3). Upon X having received this infor-
mation in another TC from a, it may repeat this cycle, alternating advertising
the link a-X as “LOST” and as “MPR”.
Routers receiving a TC will parse and process this message, specifically
updating their topology map as a consequence of successful receipt. If the
ANSN between two successive TCs from the same router has incremented, then
the topology has changed and routing tables are to be recalculated. This is a
potentially computationally costly operation [14].
A malicious router may chose to conduct this attack against all its neighbors,
thus attaining maximum disruptive impact on the network with relatively little
overhead of its own: other than participating in the Neighborhood Discovery
procedure, the malicious router will monitor TCs generated by its neighbors
and alternate the advertised status for each such neighbor, between “MPR”
and “LOST”. The malicious router will indicate its willingness to be zero (thus,
avoid being selected as MPR) and may ignore all other protocol operations,
while still remaining effective as an attacker.
The basic operation of OLSRv2 employs periodic message emissions, and by
this attack it can be ensured that each such periodic message will entail routing
table recalculation in all routers in the network.
If the routers in the network have “triggered TCs” enabled, this attack may
also cause an increased TC frequency. Triggered TCs are intended to allow a
(stable) network to have relatively low TC emission frequencies, yet still allow
link breakage or link emergence to be advertised through the network rapidly.
A minimum message interval (typically much smaller than the regular periodic
message interval) is imposed, to rate-limit worst-case message emissions. This
attack can cause the TC interval to, permanently, become equal to the minimum
message interval. [5] proposes as default that the minimum TC interval be 1
4
·
TC interval.
Indirect Jamming by a malicious router can thus have two effects: it may
cause increased frequency of TC generation and transmission, and it will cause
additional routing table recalculation in all routers in the network.
4 Inconsistent Topology
Inconsistent topology maps can occur by a malicious router employing either of
identity spoofing or link spoofing for conducting an attack against an OLSRv2
network.
4.1 Identity spoofing
Identity spoofing can be employed by a malicious router via the Neighborhood
Discovery process and via the Link State Advertisement process; either of which
causing inconsistent topology maps in routers in the network.
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4.1.1 Inconsistent Topology Maps due to Neighborhood Discovery
Considering the network in figure 13, two routers in far ends of the network
both present themselves under the same identity – as x. The routers adjacent
to these two routers (a and w in figure 13) both perceive x as a direct neighbor,
which will be reflected in the neighbor tables and routing tables of these two
routers. Thus, the first consequence is, that traffic destined for x from a and
w, respectively, will be delivered to different routers. As the Neighborhood
Discovery procedure also provides topological information up to two hops away,
this is also true for traffic destined for x from b and v, respectively.
a b v w Xx
spoofs x
Figure 13: Identity Spoofing: a router (gray circle) assumes the identity of
router x, located far away in the network.
Assuming unit-cost links, the distance to x from a and w, as produced by the
Neighborhood Discovery procedure, is 1 hop. The distance to x from b and v,
as produced by the Neighborhood Discovery procedure, is 2 hops. As these
distances are shorter than (or equal to) the path lengths obtained via the Link
State Advertisement procedure, they will therefore be preferred by a, b, v and
w, over those acquired via the Link State Advertisement procedure for when
calculating routing tables. Thus, if the gray router X in figure 13 is the one
spoofing the identity of the white router x, then any traffic from or transiting
through w and destined for x will be delivered to the gray router X instead of
to the white x.
This has as impact that a router spoofing the identity of another router,
and by simply participating in the Neighborhood Discovery procedure, will be
able to alter the topology maps in routers up to 2 hops away, and thereby
(i) attract the traffic from or transiting through routers up to two hops away,
which is otherwise destined for the router whose identity is being spoofed; and
(ii) prevent traffic from or transiting through routers up to two hops away,
which is otherwise destined for the router whose identity is being spoofed, from
reaching the intended destination.
Strategic placement of a malicious router spoofing the identity of another
router (or other routers) in the network, and simply participating only in the
Neighborhood Discovery process, can thereby efficiently disrupt network con-
nectivity. First, overhearing TCs will allow the router to “learn” sufficient in-
formation describing the network topology to develop an attack strategy which
has maximum disruptive impact. Second, by participating only in the Neigh-
borhood Discovery procedure (i.e. by advertising its willingness as zero, and
by not selecting MPRs), and by carefully selecting the identities to spoof, the
malicious router can remain difficult to detect.
Consider the example in figure 14: X overhears and learns the network
topology. In order to minimize the risk of detection, it elects to not select any
MPRs (thereby no Link State Advertisements are sent, advertising its presence
in the network) and advertises its willingness as zero (thereby it is not selected
as MPR and thus not required to send Link State Advertisements). X also
elects to spoof the identity of a, b, f and g only. As X does not participate in
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a b dc e f g
X
spoofs: a, b, f, g
Figure 14: Identity Spoofing: maximizing disruptive impact while minimizing
risk of detection.
the Link State Advertisement process, its presence is known only to c, d and
e, i.e. the routers whose identity it spoofs will not receive control messages
allowing them to detect that these identities are also advertised elsewhere in
the network. Traffic transiting d, from either side, to destinations a, b, f and g
will, rather than being forwarded to the intended destination, be delivered to X.
Traffic transiting c and with b as destination will be delivered to the intended
router b. Traffic transiting c and with a as destination may be delivered to the
intended router a via b or to X via d – as the paths will be of equal length.
In figure 14, c is the only router which will receive control traffic indicating
two topologic locations of the identities a, b. However, especially in a wireless
environment, this is not in and by itself unusual: a valid link might indeed exist
between a and d as well as between b and d, e.g. through another wireless chan-
nel. Thus, the topology as perceived by c and e does not appear “improbable”.
If the network grows to the left of a or to the right or g, all X has to do
to continue disrupting the network is to “learn” the identities of the routers
beyond a and g and also spoof the identities of these. In general, for maximum
disruptive impact and minimum visibility, the malicious router would select to
spoof the identities of all routers which are topologically 3 hops or more away
from itself.
Identity spoofing by a malicious router, strictly participating only in the
Neighborhood Discovery process, thus, creates a situation wherein two or more
routers have substantially inconsistent topology maps: traffic for an identified
destination is, depending on where in the network it appears, delivered to dif-
ferent routers.
4.1.2 Inconsistent Topology Maps due to Link State Advertisements
An inconsistent topology map may also occur when the malicious router takes
part in the Link State Advertisement (LSA) procedure, by selecting a neighbor
as MPR, which in turn advertises the spoofed identities of the malicious router.
This attack will alter the topology maps all routers of the network.
c Xfb eda
spoofs a
Figure 15: Identity Spoofing: malicious router X spoofs the identity of a, leading
to a wrongly perceived topology.
In figure 15, X spoofs the address of a. If X selects f as MPR, all routers in
the network will be informed about the link f-a by the TCs originating from f.
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Assuming that (the real) a selects b as MPR, the link b-a will also be advertised
in the network, resulting in a perceived topology as depicted in figure 16.
c afb eda
Figure 16: Identity Spoofing: the gray malicious router spoofs the identity of
router a.
When calculating paths, b and c will calculate paths to a via b, as illustrated
in figure 17(a); for these routers, the shortest path to a is via b. e and f will
calculate paths to a via f, as illustrated in figure 17(b); for these routers, the
shortest path to a is via the malicious router X, and these are thus disconnected
from the real a. d will have a choice: the path calculated to a via b is of the same
length as the path via the malicious router X, as illustrated in figure 17(b).
cba
(a) Routers b and c.
Xf g
spoofs a
(b) Routers e and f.
c Xfb eda
spoofs a
(c) Router d.
Figure 17: Routing paths towards a, as calculated by the different routers in
the network in presence of a malicious router X, spoofing the address of a.
In general, the following observations can be made:
• The network will be split in two, with those routers closer to b than to X
reaching a, whereas those routers closer to X than to b will be unable to
reach a.
• Routers beyond b, i.e. routers beyond one hop away from a will be unable
to detect this identity spoofing.
The identity spoofing attack via the Link State Advertisement procedure
has a higher impact than the attack described in section 4.1.1, since it alters
the topology maps of all routers in the network, and not only in the 2-hop
neighborhood. However, the attack is easier to detect by other routers in the
network. Since the malicious router is advertised in the whole network, routers
whose identities are spoofed by the malicious router can detect the attack. For
example, when a receives a TC from f advertising the link f-a, it can deduce that
some entity is injecting incorrect Link State information as it does not have f
as one of its direct neighbors.
As the malicious router X does not itself send the TCs, but rather, by virtue
of MPR selection, ensures that the addresses it spoofs are advertised in TCs
from its MPR selector f, the attack may be difficult to counter: simply ignoring
TCs that originate from f may also suppress the link state information for other,
legitimate, MPR selectors of f.
Identity spoofing by a malicious router, participating in the Link State Ad-
vertisement process by selecting MPRs only, thus, creates a situation wherein
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two or more routers have substantially inconsistent topology maps: traffic for an
identified destination is, depending on where in the network it appears, delivered
to different routers.
4.2 Link Spoofing
Link Spoofing is a situation in which a router advertises non-existing links to
another router (possibly not present in the network). Essentially, TCs and
HELLOs both advertise links to direct neighbor routers, with the difference
being the scope of the advertisement. Thus, link spoofing consists of a malicious
router, reporting that it has as as neighbors routers which are, either, not present
in the network, or which are effectively not neighbors of the malicious router.
It can be noted that a situation similar to Link Spoofing may occur tem-
porarily in an OLSR or OLSRv2 network without malicious routers: if a was,
but is no more, a neighbor of b, then a may still be advertising a link to b for
the duration of the time it takes for the the Neighborhood Discovery process to
determine this changed neighborhood.
In the context of this memorandum, Link Spoofing refers to a persistent
situation where a malicious router intentionally advertises links to other routers,
for which it is not a direct neighbor.
4.2.1 Inconsistent Topology Maps due to Neighborhood Discovery
Returning to figure 4(b), MPR selection serves to identify which routers are to
advertise which links in the network as part of the Link State Advertisement
process.OLSRv2 stipulates that a router must, as a minimum, advertise links
between itself and its MPR selectors, i.e. links between itself and the routers
which have selected it as MPR. A router is not required to advertise other links.
Thus, in the example network in figure 4(b) with a selecting the malicious router
X as its sole MPR, only X is expected to advertise links to a. s selects a as its
MPR, thus a is expected to advertise the link a-S. s, then, expects a to have
selected suitable MPRs for the MPR flooding process to succeed in network-wide
diffusion of the advertisement of the link a-s.
The topology maps acquired by the various other routers in this example
are:
• Routers a and b will, due to the Neighborhood Discovery process pro-
viding topological information up to 2 hops away, acquire an accurate
Topology Map. For a this is exactly corresponding to the network in fig-
ure 4(b). For b this may or may not contain the dotted routers c and w,
depending on whether X generates Link State Advertisements (see sec-
tion 4.2.2).
• Router c will perceive a topology map as illustrated in figure 18(a):
the link state advertisements from a are not forwarded by b, hence the
existence of s and the link a-s is not known beyond b; the same is true for
a link state advertisement from X, should it participate in the link state
advertisement process. The link b-a, and the existence of a is known to b
only through the Neighborhood Discovery process.
• Routers d and beyond will receive a Topology Map as illustrated in
figure 18(b).
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• Router s will acquire an accurate Topology Map corresponding to the
network in figure 4(b). This may or may not contain the dotted routers c
and w, depending on if router X generates Link State Advertisements (see
section 4.2.2).
b acd
(a) Inconsistent Topology Map in
c.
bcd
(b) Inconsistent Topology Map
in d and beyond.
Figure 18: Perceived Topology Maps with X performing Link Spoofing in the
Neighborhood Discovery Process:
In order to maximize the impact of the disruption of Link Spoofing in
the Neighborhood Discovery process, the malicious router may simultaneously
“spoof” links to multiple routers: by overhearing control traffic “for a while”,
X may attempt to learn the identities of 2-hop neighbors of a and spoof these
– and, in addition, assume at least one additional identity (possibly not oth-
erwise present in the network). A way of achieving this is to simply have the
malicious X overhear all TCs, and spoof links to all identities of all routers in
the network, plus one identity not otherwise present in the network. As the set
of links spoofed by X is thus a superset of the 2-hop links as seen from a, a will
select X as its sole MPR.
c
X
fb ed g h ia
c d f gb ha i
Figure 19: Link Spoofing: Malicious router X spoofs links to all routers in the
network except router e. By only participating in the Neighborhood Discovery
and not the LSA process, it is more difficult to detect the spoofing, while in the
same time disturbing the topology of the whole network.
Symmetric to figure 14, figure 19 illustrates a network with X is positioned
in the middle. If X advertises links to a, b, c, d, f, g, h and i in the Neighborhood
Discovery process, these identities as spoofed by X are visible only to e as 2-
hop neighbors. e may detect that no link to X is advertised by its own 1-hop
neighbor routers d and f. Thus, to avoid such detection by e, X should avoid
spoofing links to routers advertised as 1-hop neighbors by e, i.e. advertise in its
HELLOs only spoofed links to a, b, c, g, h and i, as illustrated in figure 20.
The impact of this this attack is that:
• X will appear as the most attractive candidate MPR for e, by virtue of
spoofing links to all other 2-hop neighbors of e – and then some. Thus,
absent d or f indicating a willingness of 7, X will be selected as the sole
MPR of e.
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c
X
fb ed g h ia
c gb ha i
Figure 20: Link Spoofing: X remains more difficult to be detected when it does
not advertise spoofed links to routers at most 2 hops away.
• No routers, other than X, will be requested to send Link State Advertise-
ments, advertising links to the a.
• No routers, other than X, will be requested to forward flooded traffic
originating in or transiting through a.
4.2.2 Inconsistent Topology Maps due to Link State Advertisements
Figure 21 illustrates a network, in which the malicious router X spoofs links to
the existing router a by participating in the Link State Advertisement process
and including this non-existing link in its advertisements.
c Xf ab ed ga
Figure 21: Link Spoofing: The malicious router X advertises a spoofed link to
a in its TCs, thus all routers will record both of the links X-a and b-a.
As TCs are flooded through the network, all routers will receive and record
information describing a link X-a in this link state information. If a has selected
router b as MPR, a will likewise flood this link state information through the
network, thus all routers will receive and record information describing a link
b-a.
When calculating routing paths, b, c and d will calculate paths to a via b,
as illustrated in figure 22(a); for these routers, the shortest path to a is via b.
f and g will calculate paths to a via X, as illustrated in figure 22(b); for these
routers, the shortest path to a is via X, and these are thus disconnected from
the real router a. e will have a choice: the path calculated to a via b is of the
same length as the path via X, as illustrated in figure 22(b).
cb da
(a) Routers b, c and d.
Xf ag
(b) Routers f and g.
c Xf ab ed ga
(c) Router e.
Figure 22: Routing paths towards router a, as calculated by the different routers
in the network in presence of a malicious router X, spoofing a link to router a.
In general, the following observations can be made:
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• The network will be separated in two, with those routers closer to b than
to X reaching a, whereas those routers closer to X than to b unable to
reach a.
• Routers beyond b, i.e. routers beyond one hop away from a will be unable
to detect this link spoofing.
Returning to figure 19, if X advertises spoofed links to a, b, c, d, f, g, h and
i in Link State Advertisements, the risk of detection by e is identical to if these
were advertised in the Neighborhood Discovery process: e may detect that X
is advertising links to d and f, while X is not recorded as a 2-hop neighbor via
neither d nor f.
Suppressing links to d and f from being advertised by the X would prevent
e from detecting that X is malicious. However, upon receiving a Link State
Advertisement, a router is able to detect if it itself is being spoofed – the ad-
vertising router is not a neighbor of the router being spoofed. Furthermore,
for the reasons elaborated above, routers up to one hop away from the spoofed
destination may detect the spoofing. In the case of figure 20 d would be able
to detect spoofing of links to c (as would c be able to detect spoofed links to b
etc.) – possibly leading to a significant fraction of routers being able to detect
that X is conducting a disruptive attack and, therefore, engaging appropriate
countermeasures. e would, in this case, be the only router unable to detect the
spoofing. While this might suffice to disrupt the network, it is no different from
the identity spoofing attack illustrated in figure 14, which carries less risk of
detection of the malicious router.
The impact of this attack is similar to that presented in section 4.1.2, how-
ever, is easier to detect as the malicious router is generating control traffic
reaching the entire network.
4.3 Creating Loops
Consider the example in figure 23(a). The malicious router, X, spoofs the iden-
tity of g, and participates (with this spoofed identity) in both the Neighborhood
Discovery process and the Link State Advertisement process. In order to cover
all its 2-hop neighbors, a must select both X and c as MPRs. Hence, the link
c-a is advertised by c, and the link g-a is advertised by the malicious router X.
The topology perceived by f is as indicated in figure 23(b): paths to the
destination a exist via g (2 hops) or via e (3 hops). The topology perceived by g
is as indicated in figure 23(c): as g does not process TCs originating from itself,
the only path recognized by g towards a is via f. Therefore, if a data packet
destined for a arrives at f, it will be forwarded through g. g will forward the
data packet through f, thereby creating a loop in the network.
Consider the example in figure 24(a). The malicious router, X, spoofs the
identity of g, and selects a as MPR. Hence, the link a-g is advertised by a – a is
“tricked” into advertising a non-existing link.
The topology perceived by f is as indicated in figure 24(b): paths to the
destination a exists is via g (2 hops) or via f (3 hops). The topology perceived
by g is as indicated in figure 24(c): as g does not process TCs originating from
itself, the only path recognized by g towards a is via f. Therefore, if a data
packet destined for a arrives at f, it will be forwarded through g. g will forward
the data packet through f, thereby creating a loop in the network.
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(a) Real network topology, with malicious
router X spoofing the identity of g.
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(c) Topology Map in g.
Figure 23: Perceived Topology Maps with malicious router X performing Iden-
tity Spoofing in the Link State Advertisement process
a b
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(a) Real network topology, with malicious router
X spoofing the identity of g.
a b
f g h
d Data to a
(b) Topology Map in router f.
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f g h
d Data to a
(c) Topology Map in router g.
Figure 24: Perceived Topology Maps with malicious router X performing Iden-
tity Spoofing in the Neighborhood Discovery process
5 Why this Memorandum does not consider Re-
play Attacks
A commonly considered “attack” type is for a malicious router to record control
traffic from legitimate routers, and “replay” this – possibly somewhere else in
the network, and possibly at some later point in time. While such indeed is
possible, it should not be considered as a class of attacks on OLSRv2 in and by
itself:
• in-fine, the malicious router replaying messages is performing a combina-
tion of identity-spoofing, spoofing the identity of the router from which it
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recorded the messages, and link-spoofing, spoofing links to the (original)
neighbors of that router. Thus, the impact of such a “replay attack” is no
different from the impact described for identity-spoofing and link-spoofing.
6 Inherent OLSRv2 Resilience
While OLSRv2 does not specifically include security features (such as encryp-
tion), the protocol and its algorithms present some inherent resilience against
part of the attacks described in this memorandum. In particular, it provides
the following resilience:
• Sequence numbers: OLSRv2 employs message sequence numbers, specific
per router identity and message type. Routers keep an “information fresh-
ness” number (ANSN), incremented each time the content of a Link State
Advertisement from a router changes. This allows rejecting “old” informa-
tion and duplicate messages, and provides some protection against “mes-
sage replay”. This, however, also presents an attack vector (section 3.3).
• Ignoring uni-directional links: The Neighborhood Discovery process de-
tects and admits only bi-directional links for use in MPR selection and
Link State Advertisement. Jamming attacks (section 2.2) may affect only
reception of control traffic, however OLSRv2 will correctly recognize, and
ignore, such a link as not bi-directional.
• Message interval bounds: The frequency of control messages, with mini-
mum intervals imposed for HELLO and TCs. This may limit the impact
from an indirect jamming attack (section 3.5).
• Additional reasons for rejecting control messages: The OLSRv2 specifi-
cation includes a list of reasons, for which an incoming control message
should be rejected as malformed – and allows that a protocol extension
may recognize additional reasons for OLSRv2 to consider a message mal-
formed. This allows – together with the flexible message format [2] –
addition of security mechanisms, such as digital signatures, while remain-
ing compliant with the OLSRv2 standard specification.
7 Conclusion
This paper has presented a detailed analysis of security threats to the Optimized
Link State Routing Protocol version 2 (OLSRv2), by taking an abstract look
at the algorithms and message exchanges that constitute the protocol, and for
each protocol element identifying the possible vulnerabilities and how these can
be exploited. In particular, as link-state protocol, OLSRv2 assumes that (i)
each router can acquire and maintain a topology map, accurately reflecting
the effective network topology; and (ii) that the network converges, i.e. that
all routers in the network will have sufficiently identical (consistent) topology
maps. An OLSRv2 network can be effectively disrupted by breaking either of
these assumptions, specifically (a) routers may be prevented from acquiring a
topology map of the network; (b) routers may acquire a topology map, which
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does not reflect the effective network topology; and (c) two or more routers may
acquire substantially inconsistent topology maps.
The disruptive attacks to OLSRv2, presented in this paper, are classified in
either of these categories. For each, it is demonstrated, whether OLSRv2 has
an inherent protection against the attack.
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